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Abstract. There is a strong consensus about the need for IPsec, although its use 
is not widespread for end-to-end communications. One of the main reasons for 
this is the difficulty for authenticating two end-hosts that do not share a secret 
or do not rely on a common Certification Authority. In this paper we propose a 
modification to IKE to use reverse DNS and DNSSEC (named DNSSEC-to-
IKE) to provide end-to-end authentication to Internet hosts that do not share any 
secret, without requiring the deployment of a new infrastructure. We perform a 
comparative analysis in terms of requirements, provided security and perform-
ance with state-of-the-art IKE authentication methods and with a recent pro-
posal for IPv6 based on CGA. We conclude that DNSSEC-to-IKE enables the 
use of IPsec in a broad range of scenarios in which it was not applicable, at the 
price of offering slightly less security and incurring in higher performance 
costs. 
1   Introduction 
The aim of IPsec ([1], [2], [3], [4]) is the provision of confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity. IPsec defines two new types of headers at the IP level: AH (Authentica-
tion Header) that provides authenticity and integrity, and ESP (Encapsulating Security 
Payload) that provides data confidentiality. IPsec can be used in transport mode, in 
which all the transport and upper layer information is protected, but not the IP header,  
or tunnel mode, in which the whole IP packet is protected. Although VPNs make 
intensive use of tunnel mode IPsec between routers, IPsec has not reached widely 
adoption for protecting end-to-end communications. Furthermore, IPsec implementa-
tions like Oportunistic Encryption method proposed by the open source project 
FreeS/WAN [5] have not been widely adopted. 
There are many reasons that explain the low acceptance of IPsec in end-to-end 
communications [6]. One major obstacle for the adoption of IPsec is the authentica-
tion mechanisms available. The traditional methods for authentication are Pre-Shared 
Key and Digital Signatures (for the rest of the paper the terms Digital Signatures or 
Certificates will be used to refer to the same authentication mechanism). The use of 
Pre-Shared Key is only feasible when the number of communicating hosts is small, 
because of the difficulties of distributing of the key to each pair of hosts. Therefore, 
this solution is not valid for the casual communications that occurs in the Internet. On 
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the other hand, the use of certificates requires a common Certificate Authority (CA) 
between two hosts, but at present no unique CA hierarchy has been adopted in the 
Internet. Therefore, this solution is not valid between two hosts that do not trust in a 
common CA. However, new possibilities for authentication have arisen such as the 
ones derived from the proper use of the Cryptographically Generated Addresses 
(CGA, [7]), although in this case IPv6 is required.  
As it can be inferred from the previous paragraph, present authentication methods 
for IPsec can only be applied to hosts that conform to some restrictive conditions. In 
this paper, we try to solve the limited scope of present authentication methods for 
IPsec. We propose a new authentication method for IKE, DNSSEC-to-IKE that al-
lows authentication for IPsec in a global basis through Internet. This is because the 
DNSSEC-to-IKE method only require from the hosts to have access to the DNSSEC 
security infrastructure, provided that a hierarchical DNSSEC infrastructure over Inter-
net exists. With the inclusion of this authentication method one barrier to the usage of 
IPsec in casual communications could be removed.  
DNSSEC-to-IKE is based on the use of DNSSEC security architecture and the 
ubiquitous reverse DNS infrastructure to store securely the public key that corre-
sponds to a given IP address. The few changes required to IKE to support this mecha-
nism guarantee easy deployment.  
We perform a comparison between DNSSEC-to-IKE and state-of-the-art authenti-
cation mechanisms, to determine the conditions in which each mechanism can be 
applied, the security provided and the performance of the validation. We conclude 
that DNSSEC-to-IKE provides convenient authentication for casual communication 
between Internet hosts without requiring specific infrastructure or costly key distribu-
tion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 there is an outline 
of the general framework for IPsec authentication; both the state-of-the-art authentica-
tion methods and the CGA authentication mechanism are described. Section 3 ex-
plains the DNSSEC-to-IKE authentication method. Section 4 makes a comparative 
analysis of the authentication methods in terms of applicability, security, and per-
formance of the validation process. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the conclusions.  
2   General Overview of the IPsec Authentication Framework 
IPsec needs to establish a session security context in order to be used in AH and ESP 
headers. Although any set of protocols can be used for this functionality, the ones 
recommended for IPsec are: ISAKMP [8], [9], IKE [10] and OAKLEY [11].  
In this work, the main mode was selected for IKE Phase 1. The main mode re-
quires the six ISAKMP messages for each of the three authentication methods. The 
first two messages negotiate security parameters and the authentication interchange. 
The next two messages generate a shared Diffie-Hellman key. Finally, the last two 
messages authenticate the Diffie-Hellman key previously exchanged. Results can  
be easily extended for aggressive mode due to the similarity of the authentication 
process. 
Among the three authentication methods described by IKE, we do not analyse  
in detail the Public Encryption method because it results in the same scalability  
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problems as the Pre-Shared Key one, since it is necessary for each host to know the 
public key of the rest of the hosts to which it communicates. In the following subsec-
tions the authentication model of the IKE protocol is briefly explained for Pre-Shared 
Key, Digital Signatures [10], and CGA.  
2.1   IKE Authentication with Pre-shared Key  
In the fifth and the sixth messages of the IKE exchange, the hosts can verify the iden-
tity of each other by checking the hashes received that are bound to the Pre-Shared 
Key agreed for the communication between these two hosts.  
2.2   IKE Authentication with Certificates 
When Digital Signatures (Certificates) are used, previously to the fifth message, each 
host can request a certificate to the correspondent host - the certificate is not needed if 
the host knows in advance the public key of the other host. In the request, a host indi-
cates to the correspondent a list with the CAs in which it trusts. Next, in messages 
number 5 and 6, the hosts exchange an Authorization Payload, which is a signature 
with its private key. The messages also include a CERT Payload with certificates 
belonging to the CASs contained in the request. The host must check the authenticity 
of the certificates in order to validate the public key of the other host, and next the 
Authorization Payload is validated with the public key obtained from the certificate.  
2.3   IKE Authentication with CGA 
CGA, defined in [7], are IPv6 addresses that incorporate into the 64-bit interface iden-
tifier a cryptographic one-way hash of a public key and a prefix owned by the node, 
creating a binding between this public key and the resulting address. An enhancement 
to IKE to allow CGA-based authentication is described in [12] as a modification to 
the Digital Signatures method. In this case, the CERT payload contains the public key 
and all the parameters required to reconstruct the interface identifier of the address, 
and therefore validate the authenticity of the IPv6 address of the sending host. The 
Authorization Payload is signed with the private key associated to the public key of 
the CGA. Therefore, a host can be authenticated as the legitimate owner of an IPv6 
address by checking the validity of the CGA and verifying the Authorization Payload 
signature with the public key received. 
3   DNSSEC-to-IKE Authentication Method 
We propose a new method for authentication through IKE, named DNSSEC-to-IKE. 
This new method can provide authentication to scenarios for which previous authenti-
cation schemes were not appropriate. We first present a brief overview of DNSSEC, 
from which the DNSSEC-to-IKE method derives its authentication infrastructure. 
Then we describe the DNSSEC-to-IKE method in detail, including the modifications 
required for the IKE exchange.  
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3.1   DNSSEC Overview 
DNSSEC [13], [14], [15] defines a set of new registers for authenticating the informa-
tion that is stored in the DNS. The added registers are four:  
• DNSKEY, a public key that is associated to a DNS zone. 
• RRSIG, a signature of any register of a specific DNS zone with its private 
key associated to the public key available in DNSKEY. For the rest of the 
paper we denote the signature of a register R as SIG(R).  
• NSEC, which proves that some information does not exist in the DNS. 
• DS, a hash of the DNSKEY register of a subzone. 
Additionally, an IPSECKEY register for storing IPsec keying material associated 
to the name to be resolved in DNS [16] has also been added.  
An example of how a host can obtain a register associated with a name when 
DNSSEC is used is the following: The querier host issues a request for a given Fully 
Qualified Domain Name to the root zone, for which it must know the DNSKEY|0 
public key. The resolver sends the query to a root server, and receives a response 
containing the DNSKEY|0, SIG|0(DNSKEY0), NS|0 – Name Server -, SIG|0(NS|0), 
DS|0  and SIG|0(DS|0) registers. All of these signatures use the DNSKEY0 of the root 
zone, as it is referred by the notation SIG|0, so the host, that previously knows the 
public key for this zone, can validate all the received registers (DNSKEY|0, NS|0  and 
DS|0). The NS|0 register allows the querier host to access to the server in charge of the 
subzone requested. Also, the DS|0  register provides a hash of the DNSKEY1 of the 
first subzone. In general, the resolver will communicate with the server referred in the 
NS|i register to obtain its DNSKEY|i+1  and the information of the following subzone 
i+1. The hash of this DNSKEY|i+1  is compared with the DS|i register obtained from 
the higher level i DNSSEC server. By this way, the DNSKEY|i+1 public key of each 
subzone can be authenticated. The previous steps are repeated as many times as in-
termediate DNSSEC servers are between the root and the final local server of the host 
to be resolved.  
3.2   Description of the DNSSEC-to-IKE Authentication Method  
In this paper, we detail a method for conveying in IKE authentication information 
based on the use of the reverse DNS infrastructure along with the DNSSEC facilities 
to provide the public key corresponding to the IP address of a given host for which an 
IPSECKEY register has been configured, as required by IPsec authentication. The 
authentication information that is exchanged through IKE includes the chain of suc-
cessive zone delegations until the leaf zone that corresponds to the IP address in the 
reverse DNS is reached, along with the signatures stored in the DNSSEC. Then a host 
can authenticate the IP-based identity for a corresponding host requiring only basic 
DNSSEC parameters such as the public key of the root zone. The correspondent node 
will use the root zone public key to validate the chain of zone keys until the public 
key of the other host is validated. Note that this validation process does not necessar-
ily force accesses to the DNS, since all the information required can be conveyed in 
the IKE protocol.  
The security provided by the DNSSEC-to-IKE method has to be analysed in  
administrative terms. It is important to note that IPsec authentication requires the 
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guarantee that a given host is the legitimate owner of a given IP address. Therefore, if 
an infrastructure is built to perform this IP identity proof, it should be assured that the 
infrastructure grants the rights to claim for the IP identity to the legitimate owner. The 
reverse DNS assigns a zone to each IP address by reversing the address in IP notation, 
and prepending the resulting string to the in-addr.arpa or ip6.arpa suffix, defining a 
correspondence between an IP address and a reverse DNS leaf zone. The RIRs (Re-
gional Internet Registries1) guarantee that only the administration responsible for a 
range of addresses is assigned the management of the corresponding reverse DNS 
zone. Reverse DNS zone management is further delegated to clients as addresses are. 
The assignment of a stable address to a given host is also the responsibility of the 
administration in charge of the most specific address range. Then, through the appro-
priate coordination between the end-host administrator and the end-site administrator, 
the information stored in this reverse DNS infrastructure should correspond to the 
legitimate IP user. 
Next we describe the details of the modifications of IKE to convey this informa-
tion. Since a chain of successive DNSSEC authentication registers should be inter-
changed and a list of acceptable DNSSEC root servers for authentication should be 
suggested, then this is analogous to the Digital Signature authentication method but 
certificates and CAs are used instead of DNSSEC registers and DNSSEC root servers. 
For this reason, the IKE Digital Signature method can be taken as a starting point for 
the definition of the DNSSEC-to-IKE method. For the meaning of the Certification 
Request Payload, CERT Payload and Authentication Payload and its use inside the 
IKE Digital Signatures authentication method, the correspondent RFCs should be 
consulted [8], [10]. Next, we describe how these fields should be used for the 
DNSSEC-to-IKE method. 
The validation process can be accelerated if the verification of some parts of the 
certificate chain could be omitted. For example, a host in the same network segment 
as the correspondent knows securely the public key in the DNSSEC for the segment, 
so there is no need to receive and validate the whole certificate chain beginning from 
the root zone. Therefore, a Certification Request Payload is used to suggest accept-
able roots for the authentication, with the following different cases: 
1) A Certification Request Payload is sent with a list of zones of the reverse DNS 
domain name corresponding to the IP address. In this case, the requester knows the 
DNSKEY public key for any of this zones, so the answer can include the security 
chain starting from any of this zones (preferably, the chain starting from the most 
specific zone should be sent to reduce the authentication payload).  
2) A Certification Request Payload is sent with an empty zone name. In this case, a 
host is requesting all the authentication information of all the zones the other host 
holds, preferably starting from the root DNS zone to avoid the need for accessing to 
the DNS to perform the validation. 
3) The Certification Request Payload is not sent. This occurs when the sender already 
has the public key of the other host, for example because it obtained it through 
DNSSEC.  
                                                          
1
  The RIRs have been delegated the responsability for managing the assignment of addresses, 
reverse DNS zones and autonomous system numbers, in their corresponding regions. Cur-
rently there are five RIRs: RIPE, ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC and AFRINIC. 
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For the each previous cases of Certification Request Payload, we have to consider 
the following CERT Payload formats: 
1) If a Certification Request Payload is sent with a list of zones, then the CERT will 
contain only one block of DNSSEC-to-IKE information, with the information related 
to the zone with a more specific or complete name. 
2) If the Certification Request Payload is sent with an empty zone name, then the 
CERT will contain only one block of DNSSEC-to-IKE information with the informa-
tion correspondent to the zone with a shorter name.  
3) If a Certification Request Payload is not sent, then the CERT will be empty.  
A block of DNSSEC-to-IKE information contains the chain of successive 
DNSSEC registers required by a host that knows the DNSKEY of the zone of the 
reverse DNS name to authenticate to finally obtain the IPSECKEY of the host to be 
authenticated. Such a block is inserted into the CERT Payload and includes the chain 
of data composed by N pairs of information of this type: 
 
DNSKEY|i, SIG|i (DNSKEY|i), DS|i, SIG|i (DS|i) 
 
N is the number of DNSSEC successive subzones from a root zone to the final 
zone. All these zones are contained in the name stored in reverse DNS (for example 
the 4.3.2.1.in-addr.arpa name contains the following subzones: arpa, in-adrr.arpa, 
1.in-addr.arpa and so on). Moreover, the block includes the DNSEC information of 
the public key of the IP address from the final zone: 
 
IPSECKEY|N, SIG|N (IPSECKEY|N) 
 
 In the same way, a resolver DNSSEC host that knows the DNSKEY public key of 
the root zone can obtain the DNSSEC chain of authentication directly from the 
DNSSEC infrastructure instead of requesting it in the Certification Request Payload 
of IKE. However, including all the certification information in the IKE messages 
reduces the latency for host authentication. 
The Authentication Payload includes a signature of the data used to authenticate 
the entity of the ID payload. In the DNSSEC-to-IKE, it is signed with the private 
key associated to the public key stored in the DNSSEC server (IPSECKEY|N  
register).    
4   Comparative Analysis 
In this section, a comparative analysis is performed between different authentication 
methods in terms of security, performance, and applicability. The methods considered 
for the analysis are Pre-Shared Key, Certificates, the IKE extensions for CGA-based 
authentication, and the DNSSEC-to-IKE method proposed in this paper. 
4.1   Requirements 
In this subsection, we discuss the requirements for applying each authentication 
method, so that it can be understood in which scenarios can be applied. 
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The Pre-Shared Key method requires the secure distribution of the agreed key be-
fore the communication.  
The requirements for applying the Certificates method to authenticate a host are the 
following:  
• A shared trusted CA in the hierarchy path of both the requesting host and 
the host to be authenticated  
• Proper management for the Certification Authorities ensuring proper 
password security, revocation lists, etc. 
The basic requirement for applying the CGA is that the authenticated address must 
be an IPv6 address.  
The requirements for applying the DNSSEC-to-IKE authentication method are:  
• The host to be authenticated must have an associated public key signed by 
its zone  
• The requesting host must have at least the DNSKEY public key of a re-
verse DNS zone to which the host to be authenticated belongs, being the 
root zone a special case for this.  
It may be required for the requester to implement resolver functions if the host to 
be authenticated does not include in the CERT payload the whole chain of signatures 
beginning at the root key, because the requester would need to use the DNS protocol 
to access to the keys of the upper zones in the hierarchy. However, this can be re-
moved by requiring at the host to be authenticated to configure the whole chain to its 
reverse DNS name.   
It is relevant to highlight that the deployment of an authentication mechanism for 
IPsec does not require additional infrastructure to the one naturally provided for se-
curing the DNS, except for the configuration of the key of the reverse name corre-
sponding to the end-host. 
With these considerations, we can derive some conclusions:  
CGA allows authentication between hosts that do not share any common informa-
tion, and does not require any kind of infrastructure. These two valuable features are 
not available in the other authentication methods. Unfortunately, the IPv6 restriction 
limits drastically the number of practical scenarios in which the requirements are 
fulfilled, although it could be useful in the future if IPv6 is deployed.  
Pre-Shared Key is limited to few hosts, so it cannot be considered as a solution for 
broad Internet support.  
The Certificate based method can be applied for all the hosts that trust a common 
CA. Consequently, its applicability is restricted, since a common CA infrastructure is 
not currently available for authenticating any pair of hosts in the Internet.  
Finally, the DNSSEC-to-IKE method enables the possibility of authenticating any 
pair of hosts in the Internet, since the DNSSEC is expected to provide an Internet-
wide trust infrastructure. Although the DNSSEC infrastructure has not been fully 
deployed, recent advances have been made for the specific support of reverse DNS 
zones: the reverse DNS zones depending from RIPE (www.ripe.net) are signed since 
January 2006. The deployment of DNSSEC for reverse DNS zones by the RIRs 
would enable access to the reverse DNS with the authentication being provided by a 
small number of keys (as many as RIRs).  
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4.2   Security 
The specific risks for the authentication method based in Pre-Shared Key depend on 
the security of the key distribution process, on the hash functions and on the private 
keys exchanged, apart from the risks associated to the management of the private key 
in the host. Pre-Shared Key authentication does not depend on the trust of a third 
party.  
The security of the Certificates method is based on several aspects: the trust model 
used for issuing certificates from a Certification authority to another or to a final user, 
the security provided by the private keys of the CAs, the private keys of the entities to 
be authenticated, the revocation lists, and the appropriate management of the private 
keys in all the CAs and the authenticated host. In this authentication mechanism, the 
user must trust in one or several third parties.  
For CGA-based authentication, the weakest security element is imposed by the 
limitation to 64 bits in the interface identifier of the resulting address. An attacker can 
try to generate private/public key pairs until the 64-bit hash containing the public key 
equals to the legitimate one. CGA provides some means of making more difficult this 
attack through a SEC parameter contained in the IPv6 address that imposes an addi-
tional condition to the CGA structure, requiring the last 16*SEC bytes of a hash dif-
ferent from the one used to obtain the address to be 0. Then, an attacker willing to 
hijack the CGA identity requires O(259+16 * SEC), ranging SEC from 0 to 7. The condi-
tion expressed by the SEC parameter affects only the time to generate the CGA, not 
the time required for validating its identity. Additionally, the security of the public 
key used for the hash, and proper management of the private key are relevant for the 
protection provided by this authentication method. 
The elements affecting the security of the DNSSEC-to-IKE mechanism are the 
trust model for delegating reverse DNS domains to the administrations responsible for 
the corresponding addresses, the strength of the public key of the host and of the DNS 
zones, and the security of the private keys used by each element in the authentication 
chain. Additionally, several signatures generated by the private keys are public, so 
some attacks to the private keys used for signing are enabled.  
As a conclusion, the security offered by the presented authentication methods 
greatly varies. The Pre-Shared Key authentication method is the most robust, since 
the key used can be as strong as required, and the distribution method can be devised 
to involve a few entities, therefore reducing risks. Certificates are also robust, allow-
ing proper selection of the key length, although any of the several entities involved 
could be compromised, leading to a security disruption. DNSSEC-to-IKE is similar to 
Certificates, but it does not allow revocations, providing lower security. Finally, CGA 
provide the weakest security, because the interface identifier, that is the main crypto-
graphic token for the authorisation process, is limited to 64 bits, although the security 
can be increased by proper configuration of the SEC parameter. 
4.3   Performance Time 
In this section we estimate the computing time that is necessary for authenticating the 
other host in IKE. For the meaning of the different parameters the IKE RFC [10] 
should be consulted. D symbolizes decryption and V validation. 
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The performance time for checking the authenticity of a host with Pre-Shared Key 
is T and it can be calculated, being prf a pseudorandom function,(in case no prf is 
negotiated in IKE, then prf corresponds to the negotiated hash in IKE), as follows: 
 
T = T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6 
T1 = T[SKEYD] = T[prf(pre-shared-key, Ni_b |  Nr_b)] 
T2 = T[SKEYD_d] = T[prf(SKEYID, gxy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)] 
T3 = T[SKEYD_a] = T[prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | gxy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)] 
T4 = T[SKEYD_e] = T[prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | gxy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)] 
T5 = T[HASH_I] = T[prf(SKEYID, gxi | gxr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )] 
T6 = T[D(payloads)] 
 
T1 is the time to compute SKEYD which is a string derived from secret key mate-
rial that is only known by the two hosts (this time is calculated in a slightly different 
way in Pre-Shared-Key and Certificates). T2, T3 and T4 are the times to compute 
different keys that are used in ISAKMP. T5 is the time to compute a specific hash. T6 
corresponds to the time to decrypt the payloads of messages 5 and 6 of the IKE ex-
change. T2, T3, T4, T5 and T6 also appear in the estimation of the authentication cost 
for the rest of the methods.  
The performance time T for checking the authenticity of a host with Digital Signa-
tures (certificates) is calculated as: 
 
T = T1+T2+T3+T4+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7+T8 
T1 =  T[SKEYID] = T[prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, gxy)] 
T7 = V(SIGN) +M 
T8 = N * T[check one certificate] = N * (V [certificate] + hash[certificate]+M) 
 
T2, T3, T4, T5 and T6 have the same meaning as in the Pre-Shared-Key method 
while T1 is calculated a bit different. T7 is the time for validating the signed message 
that is on the Authorization Payload. T8 represents the time for checking the certifi-
cates of all the CAs that chain from the common trusted root. N is the number of CAs 
in this path, including the common trusted root. V[certificate] is the time to validate 
the encrypted hash of the certificate using the public key of a CA. hash[certificate] is 
the time to compute the hash of the certificate and M to check if it matches with the 
decrypted before. The cost expressed in T8 is also incurred when the host does not 
receive the certificates from the correspondent host but directly from the CAs.  
The performance time for checking the authenticity of a host with CGA can be cal-
culated as: 
 
T = T1+T2+T3+T4+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7+T8 
T1 = T[SKEYID] = T[prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, gxy)] 
T7 = V(SIGN) +M 
T8 = hash1(public key, parameters) + hash2(public key, parameters) + M  
 
The first seven expressions are the same as in the Certificate method. The differ-
ence for CGA is shown in T8, which represents the time required to validate the CGA 
address checking the association to the public key that has been received. Then, it 
represents the time for performing the hash1 operation as it is defined in the RFC for 
CGAs [7], and the hash2 operation if SEC is not 0, and matching the first result with 
the interface identifier of the address. 
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The performance time for checking the authenticity of a host with the DNSSEC-to-
IKE method is computed as follows: 
 
T = T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7+T8 
T1 = T[SKEYID] = T[prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, gxy)] 
T7 = V(SIGN) +M 
T8 = N * T[check registers of one server of the chain]= N *T[ (V[DNSKEY] + 
hash[DNSKEY] + M + V[DS] + hash[DS] + M )] 
T9 = T[check final registers] = T[V[IPSECKEY] + hash[IPSECKEY] + M] 
 
The first seven expressions are analogous to the method with certificates. T8 repre-
sents the time for validating the DNSKEY and DS registers that form the chain of 
authenticity if N zones are considered. T9 is the time for validating the final 
IPSECKEY register. 
We have measured the CPU time required for the validation with each authentica-
tion method in a Pentium 4, 2.1 GHz with Windows XP. For each authentication 
method, different authentication cases were considered. For each authentication case, 
the different IKE messages were generated, considering typical payload values. The 
execution time is the medium time between all the considered cases. For each case, 
the time is calculated adding the different execution times of each cryptographic op-
eration performed in the PC. It was used for IKE: Diffie-Hellman group 2 (1024 bits), 
DES as encryption algorithm, HMAC-SHA-1 as hash function and also as prf func-
tion.  X.509 has been used for certificates and RSA-1024 as digital signature algo-
rithm. The results are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Time required for the different authentication methods 




Certificates with N=1 (1 CA) 396 
Certificates with N=4 (4 CAs) 966 
DNSSEC with N=1 (1 intermediate zone) 762 
DNSSEC with N=4 (4 intermediate zone) 1870 
 
From the expressions shown above and the times presented in Table 1, we can de-
rive some conclusions. The fastest method is the Pre-Shared Key because only five 
hash operations and a decryption have to be computed. The second fastest one is 
CGA, that adds the cost a signature and two hash calculation to the previous case. The 
most expensive methods are Certificates and DNSSSEC-to-IPsec, and the validation 
time depends on the number of hierarchical elements between a root and the final 
authority for both CAs and DNSSEC-to-IKE. Being the number of intermediate ele-
ments in the hierarchy the same, then certificates will execute about two times faster 
than DNSSEC because in DNSSEC it is necessary to perform two validation opera-
tions per each hierarchical element, while for certificates only one is required. 
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5   Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we have presented a new authentication method for IPsec, DNSSEC-to-
IKE for the inclusion of DNSSEC based authentication in the IKE exchange. This 
new method provides authentication for the use of IPsec between two end hosts in 
many situations that were not possible with previous authentication methods if the 
appropriate DNSSEC infrastructure exists. 
The DNSSEC-to-IKE method is a variation from the IKE Digital Signatures au-
thentication specification. The security of the information in which the DNSSEC-to-
IKE authentication relies is provided by applying DNSSEC to the reverse DNS infra-
structure. The IKE exchange contains a chain of authenticating elements that rely on 
the key of a zone known for both parties, being in the worst case the DNS root zone 
key, or a limited number of keys such as the ones provided by the Regional Internet 
Registries. It should be noted that the deployment of an authentication mechanism for 
DNSSEC-to-IKE does not require additional infrastructure to the one naturally pro-
vided for securing the reverse DNS. 
We have presented a comparative analysis of the DNSSEC-to-IKE method with 
traditional IPsec authentication methods and the recently proposed CGA-based au-
thentication in terms of applicability, security, and computing cost. DNSSEC-to-IKE 
is the only method that enables practical authentication for any two previously unre-
lated hosts in the current IPv4 Internet by taking advantage of the security infrastruc-
ture that is being built now for securing the reverse DNS (for example, through the 
signature of the reverse DNS zones depending from the RIRs). CGA provides similar 
features for the IPv6 Internet at a very low performance cost, although offering 
weaker security. In scenarios in which PKI is practical, the Certificate based authenti-
cation provides better security support than DNSSEC-to-IKE by means of revocation 
lists, and also provide better performance for the authentication process. Finally, the 
Pre-Shared Key method can only be applied to sets containing a limited number of 
hosts, although it provides very good security and excellent performance. 
As future work, the proposed method can be tested in different scenarios and it can 
be integrated with different IPsec implementations. In addition, an algorithm can be 
proposed to execute in each host in order to determine for each situation in real time 
what is the best authentication method to use. 
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